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Abstract
A recent article (Nu~nez et al., 2019) claims that cognitive science, while starting off as a multi-
disciplinary enterprise, has “failed to transition to a mature inter-disciplinary coherent field.” Two
indicators reported in support of this claim target one of the two journals of the Cognitive Science
Society, Cognitive Science, depicting cognitive science as an increasingly monodisciplinary sub-
field which is dominated by psychology. With a focus on the society’s other journal, Topics in
Cognitive Science, the present commentary reveals a greater degree of interdisciplinarity and dis-
cusses the relative values of diversity and integration for the field.
Keywords: Cognitive science; Anthropology; Inter- and multidisciplinarity; Diversity; History of
science; Emergence
1. Introduction
Launched during the cognitive revolution, cognitive science started off as a multidisci-
plinary investigation of the mind. Key to the inception of this enterprise was the aim to
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combine perspectives and research paradigms from its founding disciplines and turn them
into one coherent, well-integrated “science of the mind” (Gardner, 1985). More than half
a century later, Nu~nez et al. (2019) set out to assess whether cognitive science has
reached this goal. To this end, they analyzed two socio-institutional indicators (i.e., cogni-
tive science curricula and the doctoral training of current cognitive science’s faculty) and
two bibliometric indicators (author affiliations and citation patterns for Cognitive Science,
the first journal of the Cognitive Science Society). The former attest to a lack of coher-
ence in the field, the latter to a lack of diversity. Nu~nez and colleagues therefore con-
cluded that “the devised multi-disciplinary program failed to transition to a mature inter-
disciplinary coherent field” (2019, p. 782).
By and large, the data speaks for itself. Given how important institutionalized training
is for the future of a field, the two socio-institutional indicators in particular are clearly
not going to raise the spirits of those among us who are committed to the cognitive
science enterprise. The two bibliometric indicators, although being coarse proxies only (a
point to which I will return in Section 2.2.; and see Cooper, 2019), jointly reflect the
unquestionable overrepresentation of psychology in the journal. Yet, while there is a lot
to deplore, and ideally to remedy, the state of the field is not as desolate as suggested. To
support this view, I will take a closer look at the society’s second journal, Topics in Cog-
nitive Science, analyzing the content of what is regarded as topical in the field—both in
general and with a focus on anthropology—before discussing the relative values of inte-
gration and diversity.1
2. Topics in Cognitive Science
The journal Topics in Cognitive Science (topiCS for short) is the second flagship jour-
nal of the Cognitive Science Society, launched in 2009. In its first ten years, it served as
outlet for 495 scientific publications. Approximately 10% of these are “Best of” papers
from the society’s annual conference (CogSci) and, more recently, the International Con-
ference on Cognitive Modeling (ICCM). The lion’s share of publications, however,
belongs to the specific topics that are characteristic of the journal.
2.1. Topics in topiCS
Topics that are proposed to the journal’s editorial board for review come from within,
and on occasion outside of, the cognitive science community. Typically, they consist of
one or several of the following article types: an introduction to the topic, original
research articles, reviews and syntheses, or debate contributions such as commentaries
and replies.
From 2009 to 2018, a total of 42 topics were published. The bulk of these revolved
around specific research subjects, both classic (like language or learning) and novel (like
music cognition or miscommunication), or around specific approaches (like the potential
of action games or quantum theory for cognitive science). Five topics adopted a meta-
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perspective on cognitive science itself, among them one on the role of philosophy and
one on the role of anthropology for cognitive science, the latter with the largest number
of contributions among all of the topics.
Feeding the titles and keywords of all topic contributions into a word cloud program
produces the picture in Fig. 1a. It renders “cognitive” as the most frequent word, fol-
lowed by “language,” “modeling,” “science,” and “learning.”
Word clouds, however, are imprecise in many regards. For instance, they may collapse
words with divergent meanings (like modeling and model), while segregating words
indicative of the same concept (like language and linguistic). In a second step, therefore,
a more in-depth analysis was conducted, this time also comparing the topic contributions
with the “Best of” papers from both CogSci and ICCM. For each publication category,
the 10 most frequently mentioned concepts were identified, and the frequencies were cal-
culated for the combined set of concepts (depicted in Fig. 1b).
There are several noteworthy aspects. First, “cogn-” remains the most or second most
frequent term in all three categories. Interestingly, though, only in the topic contributions
is a substantial proportion of this (18%) allotted to the composite label “cognitive
science” (rendering this the fourth most frequent term), while it is functionally absent in
the other two categories. One reason for this is that contributions to topics more often
take a meta-perspective on the discipline (such as “The original sin of cognitive science,”
Levinson, 2012).2
Second, the contributions to the publication categories do share a concern with a set of
subjects, even if to varying degrees, but this set is relatively restricted. Only four con-
cepts are among the 10 most frequent in all three categories alike: Besides “cognitive,”
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Content frequency in all topic contributions (titles and keywords combined). (a) The 75 most frequent
content words (graph produced with TagCrowd). (b) Relative frequency of those concepts that were among
the 10 most frequently mentioned content words in at least one of the three publication categories: topics
contributions (topics), “Best of” papers from CogSci (CogSci), and “Best of” papers from ICCM (ICCM).
Content words on the x-axis are roughly ordered so as to maximize clarity; values on the y-axis show the rel-
ative frequency of mentioning in % of number of articles in the respective publication category (n = 442 for
topics, 36 for CogSci, and 17 for ICCM).
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these are “modeling,” “computational,” and “learning.” Even if comparing only the
CogSci and ICCM papers, the number of subjects of common interest increases by just
one (i.e., “memory”). This pattern seems to indicate an ongoing commitment to computa-
tional modeling, arguably the signature approach of cognitive science, but also substantial
diversity—or lack of integration in the words of Nu~nez and colleagues—with regard to
concrete subjects.
Third, both the ICCM and CogSci papers seem to be somewhat more homogeneous in
terms of content, the former, unsurprisingly, with a relatively strong focus on computa-
tional modeling and cognitive architecture applied to memory and learning, the latter with
somewhat more concern also with neuroscience concepts, Bayesian modeling, and lan-
guage. Contributions to topics, by contrast, exhibit much greater diversity, which is
reflected in the overall lower proportions of single concepts (besides “cognitive,” only
“language” and “learning” are represented with more than 20%). The topic contributions
also stand out through their concern with novel subjects that are entirely absent in one of
the other two categories (e.g., “socio/social,” “action,” or “development”) or in both of
them (e.g., “embod,” “quantum,” “cultur,” and “anthropology”). In fact, three of these
subjects (“socio/social,” “cultur,” and “embod”) are among the 10 most frequent subjects
in topic contributions.
2.2. Anthropology in topiCS
In order to gain a more accurate picture of the diversity in the topic contributions, the
following analysis will zoom in on content. This will be undertaken with a specific focus
on anthropology, not only because of my own background, but also because it features as
a case in point in Nu~nez et al. (2019). In fact, once a pioneer and founding member in
the cognitive science endeavor, anthropology has become its “missing discipline” (Boden,
2006; and see Fig. 1 in Nu~nez et al., 2019) and is hence arguably the one discipline for
which it is not so much integration that is at stake, but rather rapprochement in the first
instance (Beller, Bender, & Medin, 2012).
This estrangement is underlined by recent data showing that doctoral training in cogni-
tive science completely lacks faculty members with a background in anthropology and
does not include a single obligatory course in this discipline (Nu~nez et al., 2019). When
it comes to publications in Cognitive Science, a functional absence of anthropology is
reflected both in the author affiliations in all 1,020 articles published since 2000 and in
the journal’s citation environment for the years 2000, 2007, and 2014. As someone with
a strong commitment to reconnecting anthropology with cognitive science (e.g., Beller
et al., 2012; Bender, Hutchins, & Medin, 2010), I cannot but agree with this depiction.
And yet, I am more optimistic than the authors appear to be. But before laying out my
main arguments, a few qualifications may be in order.
First, while author affiliation is a useful proxy for a scholar’s background, it is not
always indicative or accurate (as in my own case); especially anthropologists who are
concerned with cognition frequently end up in non-anthropological institutions.
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Add to this the demographics involved: Contributions to conferences and journals
reflect the proportions of the respective ‘populations.’ The base rate of potential contribu-
tions from psychology is one or two orders of magnitude greater than that for anthropol-
ogy.3 In the case of conference contributions, proportions further depend on the
opportunities for attending, with CogSci being infeasible for most anthropologists both in
terms of timing and expense (cf. Beller et al., 2012).
And finally, bibliometric indicators based on a journal’s citation environment ignore the
specifics of publication traditions in different disciplines. Anthropologists (but not only
anthropologists) have a much stronger preference than, say, psychologists for monographs
and edited volumes. Furthermore, cognitive research lies solidly outside of mainstream
anthropology and hence frequently ends up in interdisciplinary journals or more content-
specific journals from neighboring disciplines. To illustrate this, take the article by Astuti
and Harris (2008) in Cognitive Science, which can be regarded as a role model for interdis-
ciplinary work involving anthropology. While over half of the 51 sources cited in this article
are anthropological references, only two of them appeared in anthropological journals. In
other words: Even if many more such papers were published in Cognitive Science, the bib-
liometric indicator would still detect only a marginal increase in anthropological references.
Importantly, none of these caveats substantially changes the overall picture of a pre-
vailing imbalance, in which anthropology is substantially less clearly represented than
most other disciplines. So whence my optimism? The first indication that anthropological
contributions may be less marginalized in cognitive science than assumed is furnished by
Fig. 1a, which reflects that subjects clustering around “culture” are among the 10 most
frequent ones in the topic contributions in topiCS, and subjects clustering around “anthro-
pology” are among the 25 most frequent (Fig. 2 depicts frequencies separately for titles
and keywords to highlight the partly disjunct distribution of the two terms).
To identify publications bearing an anthropological mark, a search for relevant terms was
conducted over the titles and keywords of all topic contributions. These terms included “an-
thropol,” “ethno,” “arch[a]e,” “ecology” (subsequently narrowed to usage in Hutchins’s
(2010) sense of cognitive ecology), “cultur,” “folk,” “indig,” and “cross” (subsequently nar-
rowed to usage in cross-cultural or cross-linguistic comparisons). Further correcting for
instances in which more than one search term was associated with a single article resulted
in 37 contributions that explicitly targeted anthropology (including archaeology) and another
18 contributions that dealt with culture (including enculturation and cultural evolution) or
employed anthropological methods (such as ethnomethodology or comparisons)—hence
amounting to 12% of all topic contributions. One of these, Hutchins’s (2010) Cognitive
Ecology is even ranked as number 7 in the top 10 most frequently cited topiCS papers ever.
When scrutinizing the topics themselves, the results are even more encouraging.
Almost one third (13 out of 42) of them include anthropological considerations: Besides
the two that explicitly focus on anthropology, eleven more contain contributions that are
(co-)authored by anthropologists, adopt anthropological methods, or develop anthropolog-
ical ideas.
While I could have included topics that tackle questions with a long tradition in
anthropology such as those involved in collective behavior, embodied cognition, or
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mathematical practice and cognition, I would rather take the lack of (apparent) anthropo-
logical involvement here as an opportunity to note that it is not always easy to recruit
anthropologists to such topics.
Finally, disciplines also exert an influence by way of the ideas they propagate.
When firmly establishing appealing ideas in new fields, the watermark of the discipline
in which they originated may be so blurred that future generations become more and
more oblivious of their provenance, perceiving the contribution as just one variant of
cognitive science (Bender et al., 2015, p. 685). Some of the arguably most productive
ideas in cognitive science originated from anthropology, broadly conceived, or were
inspired by an anthropological perspective: from theoretical concepts such as dis-
tributed and embodied cognition (Hutchins, 1995; Ingold, 2000), through methods like
cross-cultural studies (Murdock & White, 1969; Tylor, 1889), to entire research topics
like cultural evolution (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Gray et al., 2007). While the absorp-
tion of these ideas would be regarded a mark of successful integration, it certainly ren-
ders it more difficult for abstract indicators to detect and trace the impact of the
respective discipline.
2.3. The integrative potential of topiCS
If nothing else, the data presented here at least show that the picture obtained depends
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Fig. 2. The 14 most frequent content words in all topic contributions: (a) titles (n = 442) and (b) keywords
(n = 420). In the former, “anthropology” ranks as 13th (together with “theory”); in the latter, “cultur-” (ag-
gregating across “culture,” “cultural,” and “enculturation”) ranks as 8th.
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as they attest to the willingness and ability of the field to tackle challenges and open up
opportunities for minority perspectives and fields.
Akin to cultures, scientific fields are emergent phenomena, organized by attractors
(Sperber, 1996) and subject to diverse degrees of consensus (Gatewood, 2012; Romney,
Weller, & Batchelder, 1986). Submissions to conferences and journals largely pattern a
research field in a bottom-up manner by both reflecting and stabilizing mainstream ten-
dencies. It was presumably for this reason that Nu~nez and colleagues picked Cognitive
Science for their bibliometric analyses. Being a more classic type of journal, it is repre-
sentative of the manuscripts submitted. While the journal website stresses its focus “on
the multidisciplinary study of minds and other intelligent systems” and emphasizes that
manuscripts “which are specifically written for a multidisciplinary audience are given the
highest priority” (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/page/journal/15516709/homepage/For
Authors.html, retrieved September 6, 2019), the editors can only choose from what they
receive. And even if papers which are “accessible to only a narrow or discipline-specific
audience” tend to be returned without formal review, publications largely reflect the pro-
portions of research topics and researcher populations.
Partly to compensate for this, topiCS also invites proposals from outside of the main-
stream. The editorial board is charged with proactively recruiting “exciting, under reported
work, across the full-range of cognitive science topics.” Specifically welcome are great
debates; integrative and reflective contributions, for which established researchers are
encouraged to examine broader issues and trends in cognitive science; and new or emerging
work, either on established areas that are experiencing an upsurge of interest or a major
paradigm shift, or from scholars who do not consider themselves cognitive scientists and yet
are still doing cognitive science work (http://csjarchive.cogsci.rpi.edu/topiCS/FAQs.html,
retrieved September 6, 2019). Finally, all acting editors for prospective topics are asked to
ensure that their selection of contributions represents a multiplicity of perspectives.
That the publications in topiCS do not reflect the demographics in cognitive science at
large is substantiated when comparing the content of the topic contributions to the indi-
vidual papers as reported in Section 2.1. While the “Best of” papers focus more strongly
on classic subjects of cognitive science (revolving around computational models, repre-
sentations, and processing), topiCS is keener on picking up cutting-edge topics and
engaging in critical self-reflection. For this very reason, topiCS may prove to be a remedy
for some of the issues diagnosed by Nu~nez and colleagues.
3. Diversity in cognitive science
Nu~nez et al. (2019) raise two distinct, yet related concerns: They diagnose a lack of di-
versity and a lack of integration in cognitive science. Both have their roots in the over-
representation of psychology, which clearly comes at the cost of diversity (in terms of
the involvement of other disciplines) and arguably, though less clearly, at the cost of inte-
gration (in terms of theoretical, conceptual, and methodological identity across disci-
plines). The analysis presented here shows that this is less of an issue for topiCS, the
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society’s second flagship journal, where we find less psychology, more diversity of topics
and perspectives, and many instances of successful cross- and interdisciplinary collabora-
tions (Bender, Beller, & Nersessian, 2015) than is claimed by Nu~nez and colleagues for
the field at large.
Based on their approach, diversity is valuable only in the early stages of an emerging
research field, especially when it comes in the form of diversity in the sources feeding
into the field. Maturation into a well-integrated cohesive science then requires a decrease
in diversity, namely to the extent that consensus is established on the “hard core” of a
research program. In this sense, cognitive science is portrayed as “a textbook case of
failed interdisciplinarity,” especially when compared to “mature fields” like the natural
sciences or psychology (Nu~nez et al., 2019, p. 788). It may well be an empirical question
whether a random sample of, say, biologists from across the subfields would reach greater
consensus on research questions, paradigms, and methods; and when extending this
thought experiment to social scientists (including psychologists), not even major theories
(Beller & Bender, 2017; Mischel, 2009) or the core subject of the very discipline (Bru-
mann, 1999; de Munck & Bennardo, 2019) is consensual anymore.
But even if we assume that cognitive science is exceptional in this regard, integration of
diverse approaches would not be easy to detect when successful. For instance, many of the
authors in our topic on cognitive diversity engage in interdisciplinary collaboration and defy
assignment to any single discipline (Bender et al., 2015). As discussed earlier, concepts and
approaches can traverse disciplinary boundaries and become absorbed in neighboring fields.
According to Nu~nez et al. (2019), this kind of integration is far from standard in cogni-
tive science. However, the homogeneity in research questions, methods, and theoretical
developments, which follows from integration, raises the question of whether more of this
is unconditionally preferable (see also Cooper, 2019; Gentner, 2019). To tackle the com-
plex and diverse dimensions of the mind, a family resemblance model of cognitive
science may be better suited than a prototype model, that is, a cluster of related assump-
tions, theories, and methods that can be developed and related to one another more flexi-
bly, rather than consensus on a core set of assumptions, theories, and methods. With an
elusive target like the mind, into which valid and reliable insights are so hard to obtain,
wouldn’t it be wise to diversify our means for obtaining such insights?
Plurality in research strategies and paradigms may indeed prove to be vital to the
field’s prospering, and we should take pains to capitalize on it (Unsworth, 2012). Some
of the early paradigms in cognitive science (like the often criticized cognitivism) may be
limited in the scope of their applicability, and more recent approaches like distributed or
embodied cognition open up exciting new opportunities. But are these approaches truly
incompatible, and do the newer ones really vitiate the older ones? Newton’s laws still
hold, almost everywhere and in all everyday contexts, even after the advent of relativity
theory, and so too are representational accounts still instructive for a vast number of
research questions. Many subjects can be investigated, in equally conducive ways, on a
variety of levels and with complementary approaches—and most conducively so, in fact,
when combining these approaches across levels. Finger counting, for instance, involves a
representational, distributed, and embodied dimension (as well as several others), all of
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which need to be addressed when aiming for a comprehensive account of its development
and implications (Bender & Beller, 2012).
Combining diverse approaches and the insights they yield allows us to target different
components of cognition, to take different levels of analysis into account, and to broaden
our perspective by considering different points of view. Besides illuminating a phe-
nomenon, diversity in perspectives also increases affordances for “thinking outside the
box,” hence creating the conditions for cross-fertilization with new ideas, like quantum
theory (Wang et al., 2013) or the complex systems approach (van Orden & Stephen,
2012) and even raising novel research questions that will advance the field (Barrett, Stich,
& Laurence, 2012; Bender et al., 2015).
4. Conclusion
Given the complexities linked to the “multiple and diverse dimensions of the mind”
(Nu~nez et al., 2019, p. 789), a multitude of approaches to its investigation seems to be the
most sensible strategy. This is naturally jeopardized if single disciplines dominate. There-
fore, some precautions should be taken to increase the visibility of sidelined disciplines
and hence the diversity of perspectives. While the bottom-up patterning of conference and
journal topics will always reflect the predominant research paradigms, we could try to do
something about the current categorization of our journals as “experimental or cognitive
psychology”; we could be more proactive in recruiting submissions from minority disci-
plines; we might even consider designing some recommendations for what should be
included in cognitive science curricula; and if—as Nu~nez and colleagues state—“exciting
and successful cross-disciplinary mind-related work” really is produced outside of cogni-
tive science (2019, p. 782), we might wish to ensure that this work is recognized as cogni-
tive science. Providing a platform for a range of different perspectives and establishing
affordances and incentives for grasping this opportunity should remain an enduring goal.
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Notes
1. A somewhat similar, yet more fine-grained analysis of the content of submissions
to Cognitive Science can be found in Cooper (2019).
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2. By contrast, the virtual key term of the “science of the mind” occurs with a fre-
quency of less than 5% in the topic contributions and ICCM papers (with about
half of these referring to Theory of Mind/ mindreading), and it is completely absent
in the CogSci papers.
3. Just by way of comparison: While the American Psychological Association has
over 118,000 members, the American Anthropological Association has 10,000
members, the latter including not only cultural anthropologists, but also biological
(or physical), linguistic, and medical anthropologists as well as archaeologists and
linguists. In addition, while cognitive psychology is a strong and arguably expand-
ing subfield within psychology, cognitive anthropology has never had a major
impact on anthropology proper.
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